Potential games with aggregation in non-cooperative general insurance markets

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3 Citations (Scopus)


In the global insurance market, the number of product-specific policies from different companies has increased significantly, and strong market competition has boosted the demand for a competitive premium. Thus, in the present paper, by considering the competition between each pair of insurers, an N-player game is formulated to investigate the optimal pricing strategy by calculating the Nash equilibrium in an insurance market. Under that framework, each insurer is assumed to maximise its utility of wealth over the unit time interval. With the purpose of solving a game of N-players, the best-response potential game with non-linear aggregation is implemented. The existence of a Nash equilibrium is proved by finding a potential function of all insurers' payoff functions. A 12-player insurance game illustrates the theoretical findings under the framework in which the best-response selection premium strategies always provide the global maximum value of the corresponding payoff function.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)269-302
Number of pages34
JournalASTIN Bulletin
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2017
Externally publishedYes


  • Insurance market competition
  • non-life insurance
  • potential game with aggregation
  • pure Nash equilibrium

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