Political connections, ownership structure and private-equity placement decision: evidence from Chinese listed firms

M M Fonseka, Xing Yang, Gao-Liang Tian, Sisira R. N. Colombage

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    9 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In contrast with many other countries, Chinese listed firms must obtain approval to make private-equity placements (PEPs) from the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a state bureau that regulates capital market financing. We analyse the role of political connection (PC) and ownership structures when accessing private equity (PE) market, while investigating the mechanisms through which political ties operate within the regulatory process of PEPs. The findings suggest that PCs do not contribute to the firm’s decision to apply for PEPs, but firms with state-ownership demonstrate a higher propensity to apply for PEPs. PC and state-ownership appear to help firms to obtain approval from the CSRC, and these firms are treated more favourably than their rivals without such connections. Politically connected firms spend less time in managing bureaucracy, but PC and state-ownership negatively affect proceeds from the PE market in China. Firms with politically connected directors with professional business backgrounds tend to spend less time managing the CSRC, and these professionals positively affect proceeds from the PE market in China. This study provides important insights for policy-makers, investors, PE issuing firms and security market regulators.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)5648-5666
    Number of pages19
    JournalApplied Economics
    Volume47
    Issue number52
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2015

    Keywords

    • China
    • Ownership structure
    • Political connection
    • Private equity placement

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