TY - JOUR
T1 - Political connections and income smoothing
T2 - evidence of institutional investors’ monitoring in Malaysia
AU - Tee, Chwee Ming
N1 - Funding Information:
I acknowledge the financial support by M onash University Malaysia Seed Grant ( B-10-17 and B-7-17) and research assistants for their data collections work.
Funding Information:
I acknowledge the financial support by Monash University Malaysia Seed Grant (B-10-17 andB-7-17) and research assistants for their data collections work.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2020/6
Y1 - 2020/6
N2 - This study explores the association between politically connected firms (PCFs) and income smoothing. Using a Malaysian dataset from 2002 till 2015, this study finds that PCFs are more likely to engage in income smoothing activity, in comparison with non-PCFs. Further, smoothing income in PCFs is encouraged by institutional investors, as it is perceived as an attempt to convey useful private information to investors. However, the moderating effect of institutional investors are largely driven by domestic institutional investors. This study extends prior literature on income smoothing, by suggesting that political connection is a key determinant in engaging in income smoothing activity, particularly in countries where crony capitalism and political patronage is deeply entrenched.
AB - This study explores the association between politically connected firms (PCFs) and income smoothing. Using a Malaysian dataset from 2002 till 2015, this study finds that PCFs are more likely to engage in income smoothing activity, in comparison with non-PCFs. Further, smoothing income in PCFs is encouraged by institutional investors, as it is perceived as an attempt to convey useful private information to investors. However, the moderating effect of institutional investors are largely driven by domestic institutional investors. This study extends prior literature on income smoothing, by suggesting that political connection is a key determinant in engaging in income smoothing activity, particularly in countries where crony capitalism and political patronage is deeply entrenched.
KW - Income smoothing
KW - Institutional investors
KW - Institutional investors domiciles
KW - Politically connected firms
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85081264464
U2 - 10.1016/j.mulfin.2020.100626
DO - 10.1016/j.mulfin.2020.100626
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85081264464
SN - 1042-444X
VL - 55
JO - Journal of Multinational Financial Management
JF - Journal of Multinational Financial Management
M1 - 100626
ER -