Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

Fangfang Tan; Erte Xiao

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002

Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

Fangfang Tan, Erte Xiao

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In a prisoner s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	589 - 591
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	117
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002
Publication status	Published - 2012

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002

Cite this

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title = "Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game",

abstract = "In a prisoner s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.",

author = "Fangfang Tan and Erte Xiao",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002",

language = "English",

volume = "117",

pages = "589 -- 591",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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publisher = "Elsevier",

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AU - Tan, Fangfang

AU - Xiao, Erte

PY - 2012

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N2 - In a prisoner s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

AB - In a prisoner s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 117

SP - 589

EP - 591

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -