On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor

Raphael C.W. Phan; Helena Handschuh

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10

On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor

Raphael C.W. Phan, Helena Handschuh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider how related-key attacks can be mounted on the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor, and also show that its EDEx multiple mode is far less secure than one could believe. As few as about 2³² known plaintexts and related-key known ciphertexts in the first case, and 2³⁴ chosen ciphertexts in the second case are required to mount key-recovery attacks. These results show that seemingly academic attacks seriously need to be taken into consideration when it comes to real-life implementations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security
Subtitle of host publication	7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings
Editors	Kan Zhang, Yuliang Zheng
Publisher	Springer
Pages	111-122
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	3540232087, 9783540232087
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10
Publication status	Published - 2004
Externally published	Yes
Event	Information Security Conference 2004 - Palo Alto, United States of America Duration: 27 Sept 2004 → 29 Sept 2004 Conference number: 7th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/b100936 (Proceedings)

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	3225
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	Information Security Conference 2004
Abbreviated title	ISC 2004
Country/Territory	United States of America
City	Palo Alto
Period	27/09/04 → 29/09/04
Internet address	https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/b100936 (Proceedings)

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10

Cite this

Phan, R. C. W., & Handschuh, H. (2004). On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. In K. Zhang, & Y. Zheng (Eds.), Information Security: 7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings (pp. 111-122). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3225). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10

Phan, Raphael C.W. ; Handschuh, Helena. / On related-key and collision attacks : the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. Information Security: 7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings. editor / Kan Zhang ; Yuliang Zheng. Springer, 2004. pp. 111-122 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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title = "On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor",

abstract = "We consider how related-key attacks can be mounted on the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor, and also show that its EDEx multiple mode is far less secure than one could believe. As few as about 232 known plaintexts and related-key known ciphertexts in the first case, and 234 chosen ciphertexts in the second case are required to mount key-recovery attacks. These results show that seemingly academic attacks seriously need to be taken into consideration when it comes to real-life implementations.",

author = "Phan, {Raphael C.W.} and Helena Handschuh",

year = "2004",

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isbn = "3540232087",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

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Phan, RCW & Handschuh, H 2004, On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. in K Zhang & Y Zheng (eds), Information Security: 7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3225, Springer, pp. 111-122, Information Security Conference 2004, Palo Alto, California, United States of America, 27/09/04. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10

On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. / Phan, Raphael C.W.; Handschuh, Helena.
Information Security: 7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings. ed. / Kan Zhang; Yuliang Zheng. Springer, 2004. p. 111-122 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3225).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

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AB - We consider how related-key attacks can be mounted on the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor, and also show that its EDEx multiple mode is far less secure than one could believe. As few as about 232 known plaintexts and related-key known ciphertexts in the first case, and 234 chosen ciphertexts in the second case are required to mount key-recovery attacks. These results show that seemingly academic attacks seriously need to be taken into consideration when it comes to real-life implementations.

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Phan RCW, Handschuh H. On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor. In Zhang K, Zheng Y, editors, Information Security: 7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings. Springer. 2004. p. 111-122. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-30144-8_10

On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor

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