On related-key and collision attacks: the case for the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor

Raphael C.W. Phan, Helena Handschuh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)


We consider how related-key attacks can be mounted on the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor, and also show that its EDEx multiple mode is far less secure than one could believe. As few as about 232 known plaintexts and related-key known ciphertexts in the first case, and 234 chosen ciphertexts in the second case are required to mount key-recovery attacks. These results show that seemingly academic attacks seriously need to be taken into consideration when it comes to real-life implementations.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security
Subtitle of host publication7th International Conference, ISC 2004, Palo Alto, CA, USA, September 27-29, 2004. Proceedings
EditorsKan Zhang, Yuliang Zheng
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)3540232087, 9783540232087
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes
EventInformation Security Conference 2004 - Palo Alto, United States of America
Duration: 27 Sep 200429 Sep 2004
Conference number: 7th
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/b100936 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


ConferenceInformation Security Conference 2004
Abbreviated titleISC 2004
Country/TerritoryUnited States of America
CityPalo Alto
Internet address

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