Abstract
Propositional satisfiability (SAT) is at the nucleus of state-of-the-art approaches to a variety of computationally hard problems, one of which is cryptanalysis. Moreover, a number of practical applications of SAT can only be tackled efficiently by identifying and exploiting a subset of formula's variables called backdoor set (or simply backdoors). This paper proposes a new class of backdoor sets for SAT used in the context of cryptographic attacks, namely guess-and-determine attacks. The idea is to identify the best set of backdoor variables subject to a statistically estimated hardness of the guess-and-determine attack using a SAT solver. Experimental results on weakened variants of the renowned encryption algorithms exhibit advantage of the proposed approach compared to the state of the art in terms of the estimated hardness of the resulting guess-and-determine attacks.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence |
Editors | Sheila McIlraith, Kilian Weinberger |
Place of Publication | Palo Alto CA USA |
Publisher | Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) |
Pages | 6641-6648 |
Number of pages | 8 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781577358008 |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Event | AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018 - New Orleans, United States of America Duration: 2 Feb 2018 → 7 Feb 2018 Conference number: 32nd https://aaai.org/Conferences/AAAI-18/ |
Conference
Conference | AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2018 |
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Abbreviated title | AAAI 2018 |
Country/Territory | United States of America |
City | New Orleans |
Period | 2/02/18 → 7/02/18 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- Satisfiability
- Backdoors
- Cryptanalysis
- Guess-and-determine attack