Objections to the God machine thought experiment and what they reveal about the intelligibility of moral intervention by technological means

The first aim of the paper is to proffer a series of objections to the God machine thought experiment, as presented by Savulescu and Persson, The Monist, 95(3), 399-421, (2012). The second aim is to show that these objections must be overcome by any form of direct moral intervention by technological means, not just the God machine. The objections raised against the god machine involve (i) questioning its intelligibility in light of established views on the relationship between beliefs, desires, intention and intentional action, (ii) pointing out the seeming inability of individuals to attribute warranted moral praise to others or themselves in the case of abstentions from grossly immoral acts (iii) identifying a problematic ‘slippery slope’ argument, and (iv) questioning the rationale underlying the Freedom Lover’s intention to enrol on a moral enhancement course, as well as arguing that that Savulescu and Persson’s notion of ‘complete freedom’ is too stringent.