New active blockholders and adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios

Phuong L. Nguyen, Neal Galpin, Garry Twite

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns shares; and deviations fall more when the blockholder appoints a director to the firm. When a firm is above (below) target, blockholders are associated with less (more) inside debt and more (no change in) inside equity, implying there is no “one-size-fits-all” compensation change for blockholders. Outside debt and equity increase for both above and below target firms.

Original languageEnglish
Article number102127
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume72
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2022

Keywords

  • Blockholders
  • CEO compensation
  • Inside debt

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