Network games with incomplete information

Joan de Marti, Yves Zenou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players information. We demonstrate that there exists a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. We characterize the equilibrium by disentangling the information effects from the network effects and show that the equilibrium effort of each agent is a weighted combinations of different Katz-Bonacich centralities.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221-240
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume61
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • social networks
  • strategic complementarities
  • Bayesian games

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