Natural deduction and Curry's paradox

Susan Frances Rogerson

doi:10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0

Natural deduction and Curry's paradox

Susan Frances Rogerson

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

Curry s paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell s paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	155-179
Number of pages	25
Journal	Journal of Philosophical Logic
Volume	36
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0
Publication status	Published - Apr 2007

Access to Document

10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0

Cite this

@article{0e580277687b471fa29db3c051d9eb1c,

title = "Natural deduction and Curry's paradox",

abstract = "Curry s paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell s paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.",

author = "Rogerson, \{Susan Frances\}",

year = "2007",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0",

language = "English",

volume = "36",

pages = "155--179",

journal = "Journal of Philosophical Logic",

issn = "0022-3611",

publisher = "Springer-Verlag London Ltd.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Natural deduction and Curry's paradox

AU - Rogerson, Susan Frances

PY - 2007/4

Y1 - 2007/4

N2 - Curry s paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell s paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.

AB - Curry s paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell s paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.

U2 - 10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0

DO - 10.1007/s10992-006-9032-0

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-3611

VL - 36

SP - 155

EP - 179

JO - Journal of Philosophical Logic

JF - Journal of Philosophical Logic

IS - 2

ER -