Mergers and acquisitions: CEO duality, operating performance and stock returns in Vietnam

Nga Pham, K. B. Oh, Richard Pech

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)


The market for corporate control in Vietnam is characterized by the absence of major antitakeover provisions typically available in developed markets. The disciplinary threat of losing corporate control and additional monitoring mechanisms in the Vietnamese institutional setting reduce managerial entrenchment and other agency costs of CEO duality. This paper provides evidence in support of stewardship theory that CEO duality positively impacts M&A results in Vietnam. Specifically, CEO duality firms have significantly higher announcement abnormal returns and growth performance than those with separate CEO/Chairman roles. Robustness checks include two stage least square regressions and propensity score matching techniques.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)298-316
Number of pages19
JournalPacific Basin Finance Journal
Issue numberPart A
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • CEO duality
  • Emerging markets
  • Endogeneity
  • Mergers and acquisitions
  • Vietnam

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