Local equilibria in logic-based multi-player games

Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein, Thomas Steeples, Michael Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review


Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis and verification of concurrent and multi-agent systems. Typically. the analysis of a multi-agent system invoLves computing the set of equilibria in the associated multi-player game representing the behaviour of the system. As systems grow larger, it becomes inc reasingly harder to find equilibria in the game - which represent the rationally stable behaviours of the multi-agent system (the sol utions of the game). To address this issue, in this paper, we study the concept of local equilibria, which are defined with respect to (maximal) stable coalitions of agents for which an equilibrium can de found. We focus on the solutions given by the Nash equilibria of Boolean games and iterated Boolean games, two logic-based models for multi-agent systems, in which the players' goals are given by formulae of propositional logic and LTL, respectively.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
EditorsMehdi Dastani, Gita Sukthankar
Place of PublicationNew York NY USA
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781450356497
ISBN (Print)9781510868083
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: 10 Jul 201815 Jul 2018
Conference number: 17th


ConferenceInternational Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2018
Abbreviated titleAAMAS 2018
Internet address


  • Formal verification
  • Iterated boolean gaines
  • Nash equilibria

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