Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

Klaus Abbink, Utteeyo Dasgupta, Lata Gangadharan, Tarun Jain

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63 Citations (Scopus)


This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)17 - 28
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Public Economics
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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