TY - JOUR
T1 - Letting the briber go free: An experiment on mitigating harassment bribes
AU - Abbink, Klaus
AU - Dasgupta, Utteeyo
AU - Gangadharan, Lata
AU - Jain, Tarun
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
AB - This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Asymmetric liability is a mechanism where bribe-takers are culpable but bribe-givers have legal immunity. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the disciplining effect of such an implementation. Asymmetric liability on its own may hence face challenges in the field.
U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.12.012
M3 - Article
VL - 111
SP - 17
EP - 28
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
SN - 0047-2727
ER -