Knowledge of objective 'Oughts': monotonicity and the new miners puzzle

Daniel Munoz, Jack Spencer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

In the classic Miners case, an agent subjectively ought to do what they know is objectively wrong. This case shows that the subjective and objective ‘oughts’ are somewhat independent. But there remains a powerful intuition that the guidance of objective ‘oughts’ is more authoritative—so long as we know what they tell us. We argue that this intuition must be given up in light of a monotonicity principle, which undercuts the rationale for saying that objective ‘oughts’ are an authoritative guide for agents and advisors.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 27 May 2020

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