Iterated Boolean games for rational verification

Rational verification is the problem of understanding what temporal logic properties hold of a multi-Agent system when agents are modelled as players in a game, each acting rationally in pursuit of personal preferences. More specifically, rational verification asks whether a given property, expressed as a temporal logic formula, is satisfied in a computation of the system that might be generated if agents within the system choose strategies for selecting actions that form a Nash equilibrium. We show that, when agents are mod-elled using the Simple Reactive Modules Language, a widely-used system modelling language for concurrent and multi-Agent systems, this problem can be reduced to a simpler query: Whether some iterated game-in which players have control over a finite set of Boolean variables and goals expressed as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae-has a Nash equilibrium. To better understand the complexity of solving this kind of verification problem in practice, we then study the two-player case for various types of LTL goals, present some experimental results, and describe a general technique to implement rational verification using MCMAS, a model checking tool for the verification of concurrent and multi-Agent systems.