Abstract
Due to the emerging privacy-protection laws and regulations (e.g. GDPR in the EU) in recent years, dozens of multi-party computation (MPC for short) protocols have been proposed and widely applied by companies and institutions. These MPC protocols enable companies and institutions to perform joint analyses and machine learning on their private data while protecting their data's privacy. However, due to the complexity of MPC protocols, their implementations of-ten contain data leakage vulnerabilities, which can critically undermine the intended privacy protection. Additionally, most existing security analyses of MPC protocols rely on theoretical proofs, neglecting to detect possible vulnerabilities in MPC im-plementations. Therefore, detecting data leakage vulnerabilities in MPC implementations is an urgent necessity. In this paper, we propose MPCGuard, a practical frame-work for detecting data leakage vulnerabilities in MPC imple-mentations. Different from traditional memory vulnerabilities, data leakage vulnerabilities in MPC implementations cannot be identified by existing sanitizers. To resolve this challenge, we first establish a leakage identifier in MPCGuard with two neural network classifiers to identify whether an MPC implementation contains data leakage vulnerabilities. To enhance identification effectiveness, the structures of neural network classifiers are designed according to the characteristics of MPC protocols. After identifying a data leakage vulnerability, we employ a delta method to assist in locating the vulnerability. To demonstrate the effectiveness of MPCGuard, we apply MPCGuard to test 29 commonly-used MPC implementations in three main-stream MPC frameworks, i.e. Crypten, TF-Encrypted, and MP-SPDZ. We discover that 12 out of 29 implementations contain data leakage vulnerabilities, some of which can lead to the reconstruction of raw data. Until the moment this paper is written, all vulnerabilities, two of which have been assigned with CVE-IDs, have been confirmed. To the best of our knowledge, these two CVE-IDs are the first CVE-IDs assigned for data leakage vulnerabilities in MPC implementations.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings - 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2025 |
| Editors | Marina Blanton, William Enck, Cristina Nita-Rotaru |
| Place of Publication | Piscataway NJ USA |
| Publisher | IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| Pages | 2809-2826 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Volume | 9798331522377 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9798331522360 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2025 |
| Event | IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2025 - San Francisco, United States of America Duration: 12 May 2025 → 15 May 2025 Conference number: 46th https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome/11023178/proceeding (Proceedings) https://sp2025.ieee-security.org/ (Website) |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy |
|---|---|
| Publisher | IEEE, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers |
| ISSN (Print) | 1081-6011 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2375-1207 |
Conference
| Conference | IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2025 |
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| Abbreviated title | SP 2025 |
| Country/Territory | United States of America |
| City | San Francisco |
| Period | 12/05/25 → 15/05/25 |
| Internet address |
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Keywords
- multi-party computation
- privacy preservation
- vulnerability detection