Abstract
This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective
optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view
that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue
that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short
of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why
some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than
others.
optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view
that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue
that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short
of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why
some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than
others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Open MIND |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century |
| Editors | Thomas Metzinger, Jennifer M. Windt |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge MA USA |
| Publisher | The MIT Press |
| Pages | 95-112 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780262034609 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cognitive phenomenology
- Emotion
- Freestanding judgments
- Imagery
- introspection
- ntrospection-reliant
- Optimism
- Pessimism
- Scaffolded judgments
- Schwitzgebel