Abstract
optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view
that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I argue
that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short
of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why
some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than
others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Open MIND |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century |
| Editors | Thomas Metzinger, Jennifer M. Windt |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge MA USA |
| Publisher | The MIT Press |
| Pages | 95-112 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780262034609 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cognitive phenomenology
- Emotion
- Freestanding judgments
- Imagery
- introspection
- ntrospection-reliant
- Optimism
- Pessimism
- Scaffolded judgments
- Schwitzgebel
Cite this
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Introspective Insecurity. / Bayne, Tim.
Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. ed. / Thomas Metzinger; Jennifer M. Windt. Vol. 1 1st. ed. Cambridge MA USA : The MIT Press, 2016. p. 95-112.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (Book) › Research › peer-review
TY - CHAP
T1 - Introspective Insecurity
AU - Bayne, Tim
PY - 2016/5
Y1 - 2016/5
N2 - This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspectiveoptimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the viewthat introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I arguethat there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls shortof its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about whysome types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive thanothers.
AB - This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of introspection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspectiveoptimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the viewthat introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I arguethat there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls shortof its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about whysome types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive thanothers.
KW - Cognitive phenomenology
KW - Emotion
KW - Freestanding judgments
KW - Imagery
KW - introspection
KW - ntrospection-reliant
KW - Optimism
KW - Pessimism
KW - Scaffolded judgments
KW - Schwitzgebel
M3 - Chapter (Book)
SN - 9780262034609
VL - 1
SP - 95
EP - 112
BT - Open MIND
A2 - Metzinger, Thomas
A2 - Windt, Jennifer M.
PB - The MIT Press
CY - Cambridge MA USA
ER -