Introspection and Intuition: A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Otherpeer-review

Abstract

This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel’s commentary on my target paper,
in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOpen MIND
Subtitle of host publicationPhilosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century
EditorsThomas Metzinger, Jennifer M. Windt
Place of PublicationCambridge MA USA
PublisherThe MIT Press
Pages121-124
Number of pages4
Volume1
Edition1st
ISBN (Print)9780262034609
Publication statusPublished - May 2016
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Free-standing judgments
  • Introspection
  • Intuition
  • Scaffolded judgments

Cite this

Bayne, T. (2016). Introspection and Intuition: A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel. In T. Metzinger, & J. M. Windt (Eds.), Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century (1st ed., Vol. 1, pp. 121-124). Cambridge MA USA: The MIT Press.
Bayne, Tim. / Introspection and Intuition : A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel. Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. editor / Thomas Metzinger ; Jennifer M. Windt. Vol. 1 1st. ed. Cambridge MA USA : The MIT Press, 2016. pp. 121-124
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Bayne, T 2016, Introspection and Intuition: A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel. in T Metzinger & JM Windt (eds), Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. 1st edn, vol. 1, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA USA, pp. 121-124.

Introspection and Intuition : A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel. / Bayne, Tim.

Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. ed. / Thomas Metzinger; Jennifer M. Windt. Vol. 1 1st. ed. Cambridge MA USA : The MIT Press, 2016. p. 121-124.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (Book)Otherpeer-review

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Bayne T. Introspection and Intuition: A Reply to Maximilian H. Engel. In Metzinger T, Windt JM, editors, Open MIND: Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Cambridge MA USA: The MIT Press. 2016. p. 121-124