Abstract
This paper is a response to Maximilian H. Engel’s commentary on my target paper,
in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.
in which I provided a critical examination of pessimism accounts of the trustworthiness of introspection. Engel’s focuses on the distinction that I drew between two kinds of introspective judgments, scaffolded judgments and freestanding judgments, and suggests that this distinction might fruitfully illuminate the epistemology of intuitive judgments. I present some doubts about whether the distinction can be transferred to intuition in this way, and also sketch a more fundamental contrast between introspective judgments and intuitive judgments.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Open MIND |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century |
| Editors | Thomas Metzinger, Jennifer M. Windt |
| Place of Publication | Cambridge MA USA |
| Publisher | The MIT Press |
| Pages | 121-124 |
| Number of pages | 4 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Edition | 1st |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780262034609 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Free-standing judgments
- Introspection
- Intuition
- Scaffolded judgments