Informed trading by advisor banks

evidence from options holdings

Michelle Lowry, Marco Rossi, Zhongyan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Strong conflicts of interest exist within investment banks: the investment banking division possesses substantial private information, and the asset management division seeks such information. This raises the question of whether the asset management division benefits from an information advantage on client firms. While prior examinations of advisor bank trading in client firms have focused on stocks and found mixed results, we argue that the options market represents a more attractive venue for such trading. We find significant evidence of advisor banks trading in client firm options ahead of merger announcements, but no evidence of similar trading in client firm stock.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)605-645
Number of pages41
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume32
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2019

Keywords

  • investment banking
  • venture capital
  • brokerage
  • ratings and ratings agencies
  • mergers
  • acquisitions
  • restructuring
  • corporate governance
  • information and market efficiency
  • event studies
  • insider trading
  • government policy and regulation

Cite this

Lowry, Michelle ; Rossi, Marco ; Zhu, Zhongyan. / Informed trading by advisor banks : evidence from options holdings. In: Review of Financial Studies. 2019 ; Vol. 32, No. 2. pp. 605-645.
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Informed trading by advisor banks : evidence from options holdings. / Lowry, Michelle; Rossi, Marco; Zhu, Zhongyan.

In: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2, 02.2019, p. 605-645.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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KW - restructuring

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KW - event studies

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