Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: a strategy method approach

Timothy N. Cason, Vai-Lam Mui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner's dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals, and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)128-145
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume114
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019

Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Repeated games
  • Strategy

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