Inconsistencies, improbabilities and impossibilities in the case of Cardinal Pell: a reply to memory science

This article is a rejoinder to Goodman-Delahunty, Martschuk and Nolan's article published in the Criminal Law Journal in 2020. In particular, the authors critically evaluate the arguments by the psychological researchers that the High Court decision in Pell v The Queen was based upon a misunderstanding of an application of memory science involving routine practices versus singular impactful events. The authors contend their narrow focus on memory science rather than other relevant issues associated with the mind, is flawed. Their approach also overlooked the sheer weight of evidence for the defence presented at trial and the forensic disadvantage faced by Pell after 22 years. The authors argue that the High Court's reasoning was rightly based on concerns that an innocent person had been convicted because the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.