Implication of different pricing rules on generators' bidding behaviour

Ly Fie Sugianto, Zhigang Liao

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents an agent-based model to examine the employment of different pricing rules, namely the Uniform pricing rule and Pay-as-bid pricing rule. Using Q-learning in repetitive trading process, generator agents learn the market characteristics and seek to maximize their revenue by exploring bidding strategies. Supply quantity withholding and generators' collusion phenomenon have been observed in this study under certain market arrangements. The implication of different pricing rules on the total dispatch costs and generators' profit are discussed in this paper.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2011 6th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications, ICIEA 2011
Pages2421-2425
Number of pages5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 Sept 2011
EventIEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications 2011 - Beijing, China
Duration: 21 Jun 201123 Jun 2011
Conference number: 6th
http://ieeeiciea.org/2011/index.html
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=5959905 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2011 6th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications, ICIEA 2011

Conference

ConferenceIEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications 2011
Abbreviated titleICIEA 2011
Country/TerritoryChina
CityBeijing
Period21/06/1123/06/11
Internet address

Keywords

  • agent-based model
  • auction market
  • pricing rules
  • Q-Learning

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