Abstract
This paper presents an agent-based model to examine the employment of different pricing rules, namely the Uniform pricing rule and Pay-as-bid pricing rule. Using Q-learning in repetitive trading process, generator agents learn the market characteristics and seek to maximize their revenue by exploring bidding strategies. Supply quantity withholding and generators' collusion phenomenon have been observed in this study under certain market arrangements. The implication of different pricing rules on the total dispatch costs and generators' profit are discussed in this paper.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2011 6th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications, ICIEA 2011 |
Pages | 2421-2425 |
Number of pages | 5 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 5 Sept 2011 |
Event | IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications 2011 - Beijing, China Duration: 21 Jun 2011 → 23 Jun 2011 Conference number: 6th http://ieeeiciea.org/2011/index.html http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/mostRecentIssue.jsp?punumber=5959905 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the 2011 6th IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications, ICIEA 2011 |
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Conference
Conference | IEEE Conference on Industrial Electronics and Applications 2011 |
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Abbreviated title | ICIEA 2011 |
Country/Territory | China |
City | Beijing |
Period | 21/06/11 → 23/06/11 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- agent-based model
- auction market
- pricing rules
- Q-Learning