Implementing the Nash extension bargaining solution for non-convex problems

John P. Conley, Simon Wilkie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Conley and Wilkie (1993) introduced an axiomatization at the Nash extension bargaining solution defined on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex problems. In this paper we present a non-cooperative game which implements the Nash extension solution in subgame perfect equilibria in the limit as the discount rate applied between rounds of play vanishes.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-216
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Design
Volume1
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1994
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bargaining theory
  • C71
  • C72
  • Cooperative games
  • Implementation
  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Non-convex economies

Cite this