Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón, Simon Wilkie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)429-442
Number of pages14
JournalReview of Economic Design
Volume7
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2003
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • exchange economy
  • market game
  • Walradian equilibrium
  • invisible good
  • Walrasian correspondence

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