Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Carmen Beviá; Luis C. Corchón; Simon Wilkie

doi:10.1007/s100580300088

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games

Carmen Beviá, Luis C. Corchón, Simon Wilkie

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	429-442
Number of pages	14
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	7
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088
Publication status	Published - Feb 2003
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

exchange economy
market game
Walradian equilibrium
invisible good
Walrasian correspondence

Access to Document

10.1007/s100580300088

Link to publication in Scopus

Cite this

Beviá, C., Corchón, L. C., & Wilkie, S. (2003). Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence by market games. Review of Economic Design, 7(4), 429-442. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580300088

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