Illegal migration and policy enforcement

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Abstract

Workers from a source country consider whether or not to illegally migrate to a host country. This decision depends crucially on the proportion of workers who migrate and on whether or not the host country government decides to regularize them. When there is no uncertainty about economic conditions in the host country, there are multiple equilibria where workers may migrate or not and the government may regularize them or not. When uncertainty is introduced, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium where each state of the world gives rise to a unique outcome in terms of migration and regularization.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)83-86
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume148
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2016

Keywords

  • Global games
  • Illegal migration
  • International migration

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