Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.
|Number of pages||12|
|Journal||Metaphysica: Zeitschrift fuer Ontologie und Metaphysik|
|Publication status||Published - 2013|
Cobreros, P., Egré, P., Ripley, D., & van Rooij, R. (2013). Identity, Leibniz's law, and nontransitive reasoning. Metaphysica: Zeitschrift fuer Ontologie und Metaphysik, 14(2), 253-264. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-013-0125-2