Identity, Leibniz's law, and nontransitive reasoning

Pablo Cobreros; Paul Egré; David Ripley; Robert van Rooij

doi:10.1007/s12133-013-0125-2

Identity, Leibniz's law, and nontransitive reasoning

Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley, Robert van Rooij

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	253-264
Number of pages	12
Journal	Metaphysica: Zeitschrift fuer Ontologie und Metaphysik
Volume	14
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-013-0125-2
Publication status	Published - 2013
Externally published	Yes

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10.1007/s12133-013-0125-2

Cite this

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title = "Identity, Leibniz's law, and nontransitive reasoning",

abstract = "Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.",

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AU - Egré, Paul

AU - Ripley, David

AU - van Rooij, Robert

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AB - Arguments based on Leibniz's Law seem to show that there is no room for either indefinite or contingent identity. The arguments seem to prove too much, but their conclusion is hard to resist if we want to keep Leibniz's Law. We present a novel approach to this issue, based on an appropriate modification of the notion of logical consequence.

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DO - 10.1007/s12133-013-0125-2

M3 - Article

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EP - 264

JO - Metaphysica: Zeitschrift fuer Ontologie und Metaphysik

JF - Metaphysica: Zeitschrift fuer Ontologie und Metaphysik

SN - 1437-2053

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