Abstract
We provide new evidence on the value of independent directors by exploiting exogenous events that seriously distract independent directors. Approximately 20% of independent directors are significantly distracted in a typical year. They attend fewer meetings, trade less frequently in the firm's stock, and resign from the board more frequently, indicating declining firm-specific knowledge and a reduced board commitment. Firms with more preoccupied independent directors have declining firm valuation and operating performance and exhibit weaker merger and acquisition (M&A) profitability and accounting quality. These effects are stronger when distracted independent directors play key board monitoring roles and when firms require greater director attention.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 226-256 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
| Volume | 132 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2019 |
Keywords
- Corporate performance
- Director distraction
- Director incentives
- Independent directors