How to play (3 × 3)-games. A strategy method experiment

Reinhard Selten; Klaus Abbink; Joachim Buchta; Abdolkarim Sadrieh

doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00528-6

How to play (3 × 3)-games. A strategy method experiment

Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Joachim Buchta, Abdolkarim Sadrieh

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using the strategy method (Selten, 1967, Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, pp. 136-168) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing any 2-person (3 × 3)-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. In each of 5 tournaments, every strategy pair plays 500 000 games. The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, with the equilibria that maximize joint payoff being preferred when multiple exist. For games without pure equilibria, strategies are typically based on elements of the best-reply cascade: MAP (maximize the expected payoff against uniformly randomizing opponents), BR-MAP (best reply to MAP), and BR-BR-MAP (best reply to BR-MAP).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	19-37
Number of pages	19
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	45
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00528-6
Publication status	Published - 1 Jan 2003
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

2-person games
Equilibrium selection
Experimental economics

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10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00528-6

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T1 - How to play (3 × 3)-games. A strategy method experiment

AU - Selten, Reinhard

AU - Abbink, Klaus

AU - Buchta, Joachim

AU - Sadrieh, Abdolkarim

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N2 - Using the strategy method (Selten, 1967, Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, pp. 136-168) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing any 2-person (3 × 3)-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. In each of 5 tournaments, every strategy pair plays 500 000 games. The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, with the equilibria that maximize joint payoff being preferred when multiple exist. For games without pure equilibria, strategies are typically based on elements of the best-reply cascade: MAP (maximize the expected payoff against uniformly randomizing opponents), BR-MAP (best reply to MAP), and BR-BR-MAP (best reply to BR-MAP).

AB - Using the strategy method (Selten, 1967, Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, pp. 136-168) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing any 2-person (3 × 3)-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. In each of 5 tournaments, every strategy pair plays 500 000 games. The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, with the equilibria that maximize joint payoff being preferred when multiple exist. For games without pure equilibria, strategies are typically based on elements of the best-reply cascade: MAP (maximize the expected payoff against uniformly randomizing opponents), BR-MAP (best reply to MAP), and BR-BR-MAP (best reply to BR-MAP).

KW - 2-person games

KW - Equilibrium selection

KW - Experimental economics

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DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00528-6

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SN - 0899-8256

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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ER -

How to play (3 × 3)-games. A strategy method experiment

Abstract

Keywords

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