How (not) to efficiently dither blockcipher-based hash functions?

Jean Philippe Aumasson, Raphael C.W. Phan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the context of iterated hash functions, "dithering" designates the technique of adding an iteration-dependent input to the compression function in order to defeat certain generic attacks. The purpose of this paper is to identify methods for dithering blockcipher-based hash functions that provide security bounds and efficiency, contrary to the previous proposals. We considered 56 different constructions, based on the 12 secure PGV schemes. Proofs are given in the blackbox model that 12 of them preserve the bounds on collision and inversion resistance given by Black et al. These 12 schemes avoid the need for short dither values, induce negligible extra-computation, and achieve security independent of the dither sequence used. We also identify 8 schemes that lead to strong compression functions but potentially insecure hash functions. Application of our results can be considered to popular hash functions like SHA-1 or Whirlpool.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProgress in Cryptology - AFRICACRYPT 2008 - First International Conference on Cryptology in Africa, Proceedings
Pages308-324
Number of pages17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes
EventInternational Conference on Cryptology in Africa (AFRICACRYPT) 2008 - Casablanca, Morocco
Duration: 11 Jun 200814 Jun 2008
Conference number: 1st
https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-540-68164-9 (Proceedings)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume5023 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on Cryptology in Africa (AFRICACRYPT) 2008
Abbreviated titleAFRICACRYPT 2008
Country/TerritoryMorocco
CityCasablanca
Period11/06/0814/06/08
Internet address

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