Abstract
Consciousness is—or is alleged to be—related to free will in a number of ways. This chapter distinguishes two main points of contact. The first is related to belief in the existence of free will. Here, it is argued that one might appeal to the experience of freely willing an action to explain why belief in the reality of free will is widespread and/or to explain why that belief is true (or at least reasonable). The second point of contact between consciousness and free action/will holds that consciousness is in some way necessary for free action/will. The chapter considers this proposal in light of a number of distinctions: between consciousness as a property of agents and consciousness as a property of mental state, and between consciousness understood as wakefulness and consciousness understood as experience.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Free Will |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophical and Neuroscientists in Conversation |
| Editors | Uri Maoz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
| Place of Publication | Oxford UK |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 13 |
| Pages | 109-115 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780197572153 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |