Grounding entails counterpossible non-triviality

Alastair Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)716-728
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume96
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2018

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