Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable

Research output: Contribution to journalComment / DebateOtherpeer-review

Abstract

We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)e103-e103
Number of pages1
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume41
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2018

Cite this

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title = "Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable",
abstract = "We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.",
author = "Toby Handfield and Thrasher, {John James} and {Garcia Gallego}, {Julian Andres}",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1017/S0140525X18000080",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "e103--e103",
journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
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publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

Green beards and signaling : Why morality is not indispensable. / Handfield, Toby; Thrasher, John James; Garcia Gallego, Julian Andres.

In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 41, 2018, p. e103-e103.

Research output: Contribution to journalComment / DebateOtherpeer-review

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AU - Thrasher, John James

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AB - We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.

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M3 - Comment / Debate

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