TY - JOUR
T1 - Golden handcuffs and corporate innovation
T2 - evidence from defined benefit pension plans
AU - Duong, Huu Nhan
AU - Qiu, Bin
AU - Rhee, S. Ghon
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved.
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - This study examines the relation between employee incentives and corporate innovation. We find that firms with a higher defined benefit (DB) pension value secure more patents and patent citations. We further show that pension freezes, which stop the accumulation of pension obligations, negatively affect innovation outcomes. The value of a DB plan enhances innovation by motivating employees to produce higher output and through loyalty. However, pension deficits impede innovation because of the nature of inside debt. Overall, our findings call for a fresh look at pensions by policy makers and practitioners, given the historic shift away from DB plans. (JEL G31, G32, O31, O32).
AB - This study examines the relation between employee incentives and corporate innovation. We find that firms with a higher defined benefit (DB) pension value secure more patents and patent citations. We further show that pension freezes, which stop the accumulation of pension obligations, negatively affect innovation outcomes. The value of a DB plan enhances innovation by motivating employees to produce higher output and through loyalty. However, pension deficits impede innovation because of the nature of inside debt. Overall, our findings call for a fresh look at pensions by policy makers and practitioners, given the historic shift away from DB plans. (JEL G31, G32, O31, O32).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126784919&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/rcfs/cfab008
DO - 10.1093/rcfs/cfab008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85126784919
SN - 2046-9128
VL - 11
SP - 128
EP - 168
JO - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
JF - Review of Corporate Finance Studies
IS - 1
ER -