VI—Gist!

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A central debate in the philosophy of perception concerns the range of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. Are the contents of perceptual experience restricted to ‘low-level’ properties such as location, shape and texture, or can ‘high-level’ properties such as being a tomato, being a pine tree or being a watch also be represented in perceptual experience? This paper explores the bearing of gist perception on the admissible contents debate, arguing that it provides qualified support for the claim that certain kinds of high-level properties—such as being a natural scene—can be perceptually represented.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)107-126
Number of pages20
JournalAristotelian Society. Proceedings
Volume116
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Cite this

Bayne, Tim. / VI—Gist!. In: Aristotelian Society. Proceedings. 2016 ; Vol. 116, No. 2. pp. 107-126.
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VI—Gist! / Bayne, Tim.

In: Aristotelian Society. Proceedings, Vol. 116, No. 2, 2016, p. 107-126.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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