Generalized contest success functions

Birendra Rai; Rajiv Sarin

doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0328-2

Generalized contest success functions

Birendra Rai, Rajiv Sarin

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

46 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283a??290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201a??204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	139 - 149
Number of pages	11
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	40
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0328-2
Publication status	Published - 2009
Externally published	Yes

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10.1007/s00199-007-0328-2

Cite this

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