Abstract
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF)
which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of
CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper
generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple
types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and
interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283a??290, 1996) and Clark and Riis
(Econ Theory 11:201a??204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used
by applied researchers
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 139 - 149 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2009 |
Externally published | Yes |