Gender and negotiation in the small: Are women (perceived to be) more cooperative than men?

Catherine Eckel, Angela de Oliveira, Philip Grossman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We surveyed research by experimental economists that examines gender differences in negotiation in the context of two simple, two-player games. Our purpose is to uncover empirical regularities in the results that might be useful to teachers or practitioners of negotiation. In the dictator game, one player unilaterally determines the division of a fixed amount of money. In the ultimatum game, one player offers a division and the other must accept or reject that offer; if rejected, both players receive a zero payoff. The results have shown that, on balance, women tend to be more egalitarian than men, to expect and ask for less in the negotiation. Women also seem to be more responsive to the context of a negotiation and are less likely to fail to reach an agreement than men. These differences are small, however, in comparison with differences in expectations about what women and men will do. We conclude that stereotyping is alive and well in negotiations and that this can help or hinder negotiation outcomes, depending on the context.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)429 - 445
Number of pages17
JournalNegotiation Journal
Volume24
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

Cite this

Eckel, Catherine ; de Oliveira, Angela ; Grossman, Philip. / Gender and negotiation in the small: Are women (perceived to be) more cooperative than men?. In: Negotiation Journal. 2008 ; Vol. 24, No. 4. pp. 429 - 445.
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Gender and negotiation in the small: Are women (perceived to be) more cooperative than men? / Eckel, Catherine; de Oliveira, Angela; Grossman, Philip.

In: Negotiation Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2008, p. 429 - 445.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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