From Indian philosophy to cognitive neuroscience: : Two empirical case studies for Ganeri's Self - commentary on Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, & the First-Person Stance

Research output: Contribution to journalComment / DebateOtherpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest new
questions and constraints for Ganeri’s theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri’s self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1721–1733
Number of pages13
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume174
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Self-consciousness
  • Attention
  • Ownership
  • Spontaneous thought
  • Mind wandering
  • Dreaming
  • Full-body illusions
  • Virtual reality

Cite this

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title = "From Indian philosophy to cognitive neuroscience: : Two empirical case studies for Ganeri's Self - commentary on Jonardon Ganeri’s The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, & the First-Person Stance",
abstract = "In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest newquestions and constraints for Ganeri’s theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri’s self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.",
keywords = "Self-consciousness, Attention , Ownership, Spontaneous thought, Mind wandering, Dreaming, Full-body illusions, Virtual reality",
author = "Windt, {Jennifer Michelle}",
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PY - 2017

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N2 - In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest newquestions and constraints for Ganeri’s theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri’s self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.

AB - In this commentary, I confront Ganeri’s theory of self with two case studies from cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary consciousness research: mind wandering and full-body illusions. Together, these case studies suggest newquestions and constraints for Ganeri’s theory of self. Recent research on spontaneous thought and mind wandering raises questions about the transition from unconscious monitoring to the phenomenology of ownership and the first-person stance. Full-body illusions are relevant for the attenuation problem of how we distinguish between self and others. Discussing these examples can help refine key transitions in Ganeri’s theory of self and ensure its empirical plausibility. This discussion also identifies points of contact between Ganeri’s self and cognitive neuroscience, raising new questions for future research, both philosophical and empirical.

KW - Self-consciousness

KW - Attention

KW - Ownership

KW - Spontaneous thought

KW - Mind wandering

KW - Dreaming

KW - Full-body illusions

KW - Virtual reality

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DO - 10.1007/s11098-016-0826-9

M3 - Comment / Debate

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SP - 1721

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JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

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