Free actions as a natural kind

Oisín Deery

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view also overcomes difficulties confronted by previous views according to which free actions might be a natural kind. On my view, free actions exist and we often act freely, as long as we possess various features that are related in the right sorts of ways to each other and to the world. In turn, we acquire and retain the concept as long as most of us possess enough of those features.

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages21
JournalSynthese
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 1 Jan 2019

Keywords

  • Action
  • Free will
  • Moral responsibility
  • Natural kinds
  • Revisionism

Cite this

Deery, Oisín. / Free actions as a natural kind. In: Synthese. 2019.
@article{b71065c6a35a4ce3a346d8608ff876e6,
title = "Free actions as a natural kind",
abstract = "Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view also overcomes difficulties confronted by previous views according to which free actions might be a natural kind. On my view, free actions exist and we often act freely, as long as we possess various features that are related in the right sorts of ways to each other and to the world. In turn, we acquire and retain the concept as long as most of us possess enough of those features.",
keywords = "Action, Free will, Moral responsibility, Natural kinds, Revisionism",
author = "Ois{\'i}n Deery",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-018-02068-7",
language = "English",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag London Ltd.",

}

Free actions as a natural kind. / Deery, Oisín.

In: Synthese, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Free actions as a natural kind

AU - Deery, Oisín

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view also overcomes difficulties confronted by previous views according to which free actions might be a natural kind. On my view, free actions exist and we often act freely, as long as we possess various features that are related in the right sorts of ways to each other and to the world. In turn, we acquire and retain the concept as long as most of us possess enough of those features.

AB - Do we have free will? Understanding free will as the ability to act freely, and free actions as exercises of this ability, I maintain that the default answer to this question is “yes.” I maintain that free actions are a natural kind, by relying on the influential idea that kinds are homeostatic property clusters. The resulting position builds on the view that agents are a natural kind and yields an attractive alternative to recent revisionist accounts of free action. My view also overcomes difficulties confronted by previous views according to which free actions might be a natural kind. On my view, free actions exist and we often act freely, as long as we possess various features that are related in the right sorts of ways to each other and to the world. In turn, we acquire and retain the concept as long as most of us possess enough of those features.

KW - Action

KW - Free will

KW - Moral responsibility

KW - Natural kinds

KW - Revisionism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85059503931&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-018-02068-7

DO - 10.1007/s11229-018-02068-7

M3 - Article

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

ER -