Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Joonsang Baek, Ron Steinfeld, Yuliang Zheng

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

    197 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationPublic Key Cryptography
    Subtitle of host publication5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings
    EditorsDavid Naccache, Pascal Paillier
    Place of PublicationBerlin Germany
    PublisherSpringer
    Pages80-98
    Number of pages19
    ISBN (Print)3540431683
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2002
    EventInternational Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002 - Paris, France
    Duration: 12 Feb 200214 Feb 2002
    Conference number: 5th
    https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/3-540-45664-3 (Proceedings)

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
    PublisherSpringer
    Volume2274
    ISSN (Print)0302-9743

    Conference

    ConferenceInternational Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002
    Abbreviated titlePKC 2002
    Country/TerritoryFrance
    CityParis
    Period12/02/0214/02/02
    Internet address

    Cite this