Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Joonsang Baek; Ron Steinfeld; Yuliang Zheng

doi:10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6

Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Joonsang Baek, Ron Steinfeld, Yuliang Zheng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

197 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Public Key Cryptography
Subtitle of host publication	5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings
Editors	David Naccache, Pascal Paillier
Place of Publication	Berlin Germany
Publisher	Springer
Pages	80-98
Number of pages	19
ISBN (Print)	3540431683
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6
Publication status	Published - 2002
Event	International Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002 - Paris, France Duration: 12 Feb 2002 → 14 Feb 2002 Conference number: 5th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/3-540-45664-3 (Proceedings)

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer
Volume	2274
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743

Conference

Conference	International Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002
Abbreviated title	PKC 2002
Country/Territory	France
City	Paris
Period	12/02/02 → 14/02/02
Internet address	https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/3-540-45664-3 (Proceedings)

Access to Document

10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6

Cite this

Baek, J., Steinfeld, R., & Zheng, Y. (2002). Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. In D. Naccache, & P. Paillier (Eds.), Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings (pp. 80-98). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 2274). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6

Baek, Joonsang ; Steinfeld, Ron ; Zheng, Yuliang. / Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings. editor / David Naccache ; Pascal Paillier. Berlin Germany : Springer, 2002. pp. 80-98 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.",

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Baek, J, Steinfeld, R & Zheng, Y 2002, Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. in D Naccache & P Paillier (eds), Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2274, Springer, Berlin Germany, pp. 80-98, International Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002, Paris, France, 12/02/02. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6

Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. / Baek, Joonsang; Steinfeld, Ron; Zheng, Yuliang.

Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings. ed. / David Naccache; Pascal Paillier. Berlin Germany : Springer, 2002. p. 80-98 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 2274).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review

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Baek J, Steinfeld R, Zheng Y. Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. In Naccache D, Paillier P, editors, Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings. Berlin Germany: Springer. 2002. p. 80-98. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6