Abstract
Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Public Key Cryptography |
Subtitle of host publication | 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 Paris, France, February 12-14, 2002 Proceedings |
Editors | David Naccache, Pascal Paillier |
Place of Publication | Berlin Germany |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 80-98 |
Number of pages | 19 |
ISBN (Print) | 3540431683 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2002 |
Event | International Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002 - Paris, France Duration: 12 Feb 2002 → 14 Feb 2002 Conference number: 5th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/3-540-45664-3 (Proceedings) |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
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Publisher | Springer |
Volume | 2274 |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
Conference
Conference | International Conference/Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography 2002 |
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Abbreviated title | PKC 2002 |
Country/Territory | France |
City | Paris |
Period | 12/02/02 → 14/02/02 |
Internet address |
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