Abstract
Effective demand response (DR) schemes are expected to increase the efficiency of smart grids with peak demand contraction while diminishing consumers’ electricity expenses and utility companies’ cost of service/maintenance. However, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) on these DR schemes can potentially result in suboptimal solutions for most users while a few individuals flourish. In this chapter, we evaluate a targeted, strategic FDIA against a decentralized DR scheme to reduce the bill of an adversary. We analyze the attack impact using a real-world dataset and how the adversary’s gain varies with diverse circumstances. Our experimental results show that a small increase in overall demand can lead to a significant cost reduction for an adversary. Thus, in future decentralized DR schemes need to evaluate the significance of this type of FDIAs to produce more robust schemes.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Decentralized Frameworks for Future Power Systems |
Subtitle of host publication | Operation, Planning and Control Perspectives |
Editors | Mohsen Parsa Moghaddam, Reza Zamani, Hassan Haes Alhelou, Pierluigi Siano |
Place of Publication | London UK |
Publisher | Academic Press |
Chapter | 15 |
Pages | 391-421 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Edition | 1st |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780323916981 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780323985628 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2022 |
Keywords
- Demand response
- Device scheduling
- False data injection attack
- Smart grid cybersecurity