Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

Klaus Abbink; Abdolkarim Sadrieh; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8

Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

Klaus Abbink, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Shmuel Zamir

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Research › peer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively "educate" proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder's enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	25-57
Number of pages	33
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	57
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8
Publication status	Published - 1 Aug 2004
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Experimental economics
Fairness
Public goods
Punishment
Ultimatum bargaining

Access to Document

10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8

Cite this

@article{4d575bbb12984b28a757acd015eeb4a2,

title = "Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior",

abstract = "We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being {"}tough{"} and effectively {"}educate{"} proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder's enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.",

keywords = "Experimental economics, Fairness, Public goods, Punishment, Ultimatum bargaining",

author = "Klaus Abbink and Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Shmuel Zamir",

year = "2004",

month = aug,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8",

language = "English",

volume = "57",

pages = "25--57",

journal = "Theory and Decision",

issn = "0040-5833",

publisher = "Springer-Verlag London Ltd.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

AU - Abbink, Klaus

AU - Sadrieh, Abdolkarim

AU - Zamir, Shmuel

PY - 2004/8/1

Y1 - 2004/8/1

N2 - We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively "educate" proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder's enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.

AB - We report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame. In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers. We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness. In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play. The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively "educate" proposers. Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responder's enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.

KW - Experimental economics

KW - Fairness

KW - Public goods

KW - Punishment

KW - Ultimatum bargaining

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=12844275952&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8

DO - 10.1007/s11238-004-3672-8

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:12844275952

SN - 0040-5833

VL - 57

SP - 25

EP - 57

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

IS - 1

ER -

Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior

Abstract

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this