Abstract
Digital evidence is much more than what is acquired during forensic investigations. In particular when building systems that are supposed to provide secure digital evidence it is necessary to clearly define requirements. Various work on forensic evidence provides different sets of such requirements. Also ISO standardization work is concerned with forensic evidence. However, currently there is no full overview of the different relevant areas for digital evidence that can be used for guidance in the requirement phase of system engineering. Furthermore, a rigorous specification of requirements for digital evidence is missing. Formal methods have been applied to security protocols and other types of requirements, but not to describe the various requirements of digital evidence. One approach towards defining the available space for digital evidence suggests three dimensions. First, and most obviously, is the time when data is collected, processed, retained and correlated for potential forensic use. This dimension includes data collected at run-time, data collected for particular transactions, in case of deviations, for incidents, “postmortem” forensic investigations, and the digitization of evidence for court procedures. The second dimension describes the goal for which digital evidence is produced. This can be either for showing compliance, i.e. for proving that somebody was not responsible for some incident or for showing malicious events that happened and to find who did what. Finally, the third dimension consists of the actual information to be documented. Examples are the documentation of the normal system behaviour, compliance information, accidents, safety issues, malicious behaviour, identity information and various relevant parameters. A formal framework for security requirements that was developed for security requirements engineering is one promising candidate to derive a precise characterization of requirements for digital evidence in the different areas of the available evidence space. This paper is a position paper to drive the discussion and development in forensic readiness and security of digital evidence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Information Security and Privacy |
| Subtitle of host publication | 21st Australasian Conference, ACISP 2016, Melbourne, VIC, Australia, July 4–6, 2016, Proceedings, Part I |
| Editors | Joseph K. Liu, Ron Steinfeld |
| Place of Publication | Switzerland |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Pages | 249-262 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783319402536 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783319402529 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Jun 2016 |
| Event | Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy 2016 - Melbourne, Australia Duration: 4 Jul 2016 → 6 Jul 2016 Conference number: 21 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer |
| Volume | 9722 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Conference
| Conference | Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy 2016 |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | ACISP 2016 |
| Country | Australia |
| City | Melbourne |
| Period | 4/07/16 → 6/07/16 |
Keywords
- Forensic readiness
- Secure digital evidence
- Security engineering
- Formal methods
Cite this
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Exploring the space of digital evidence : Position paper. / Rudolph, Carsten.
Information Security and Privacy: 21st Australasian Conference, ACISP 2016, Melbourne, VIC, Australia, July 4–6, 2016, Proceedings, Part I. ed. / Joseph K. Liu; Ron Steinfeld. Switzerland : Springer, 2016. p. 249-262 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9722).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference Paper › Research › peer-review
TY - GEN
T1 - Exploring the space of digital evidence
T2 - Position paper
AU - Rudolph, Carsten
PY - 2016/6/30
Y1 - 2016/6/30
N2 - Digital evidence is much more than what is acquired during forensic investigations. In particular when building systems that are supposed to provide secure digital evidence it is necessary to clearly define requirements. Various work on forensic evidence provides different sets of such requirements. Also ISO standardization work is concerned with forensic evidence. However, currently there is no full overview of the different relevant areas for digital evidence that can be used for guidance in the requirement phase of system engineering. Furthermore, a rigorous specification of requirements for digital evidence is missing. Formal methods have been applied to security protocols and other types of requirements, but not to describe the various requirements of digital evidence. One approach towards defining the available space for digital evidence suggests three dimensions. First, and most obviously, is the time when data is collected, processed, retained and correlated for potential forensic use. This dimension includes data collected at run-time, data collected for particular transactions, in case of deviations, for incidents, “postmortem” forensic investigations, and the digitization of evidence for court procedures. The second dimension describes the goal for which digital evidence is produced. This can be either for showing compliance, i.e. for proving that somebody was not responsible for some incident or for showing malicious events that happened and to find who did what. Finally, the third dimension consists of the actual information to be documented. Examples are the documentation of the normal system behaviour, compliance information, accidents, safety issues, malicious behaviour, identity information and various relevant parameters. A formal framework for security requirements that was developed for security requirements engineering is one promising candidate to derive a precise characterization of requirements for digital evidence in the different areas of the available evidence space. This paper is a position paper to drive the discussion and development in forensic readiness and security of digital evidence.
AB - Digital evidence is much more than what is acquired during forensic investigations. In particular when building systems that are supposed to provide secure digital evidence it is necessary to clearly define requirements. Various work on forensic evidence provides different sets of such requirements. Also ISO standardization work is concerned with forensic evidence. However, currently there is no full overview of the different relevant areas for digital evidence that can be used for guidance in the requirement phase of system engineering. Furthermore, a rigorous specification of requirements for digital evidence is missing. Formal methods have been applied to security protocols and other types of requirements, but not to describe the various requirements of digital evidence. One approach towards defining the available space for digital evidence suggests three dimensions. First, and most obviously, is the time when data is collected, processed, retained and correlated for potential forensic use. This dimension includes data collected at run-time, data collected for particular transactions, in case of deviations, for incidents, “postmortem” forensic investigations, and the digitization of evidence for court procedures. The second dimension describes the goal for which digital evidence is produced. This can be either for showing compliance, i.e. for proving that somebody was not responsible for some incident or for showing malicious events that happened and to find who did what. Finally, the third dimension consists of the actual information to be documented. Examples are the documentation of the normal system behaviour, compliance information, accidents, safety issues, malicious behaviour, identity information and various relevant parameters. A formal framework for security requirements that was developed for security requirements engineering is one promising candidate to derive a precise characterization of requirements for digital evidence in the different areas of the available evidence space. This paper is a position paper to drive the discussion and development in forensic readiness and security of digital evidence.
KW - Forensic readiness
KW - Secure digital evidence
KW - Security engineering
KW - Formal methods
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978221149&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6_15
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6_15
M3 - Conference Paper
AN - SCOPUS:84978221149
SN - 9783319402529
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 249
EP - 262
BT - Information Security and Privacy
A2 - Liu, Joseph K.
A2 - Steinfeld, Ron
PB - Springer
CY - Switzerland
ER -