TY - JOUR
T1 - Exclusive Use Spectrum Access Trading Models in Cognitive Radio Networks
T2 - A Survey
AU - Hassan, Md Rakib
AU - Karmakar, Gour
AU - Kamruzzaman, Joarder
AU - Srinivasan, Bala
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - Spectrum frequency is a valuable resource for wireless communication but very limited in its availability. Due to the extensive use and ever increasing demand of spectrum bands by wireless devices and newer applications, unlicensed band is becoming congested, while licensed bands are found mostly under-utilized. To solve this problem of spectrum scarcity, Cognitive Radio (CR) devices can share licensed bands opportunistically in several ways. We analyze the three main dynamic sharing models (commons, shared-use and exclusive-use) proposed in literature with extensive analysis of the exclusive-use model, which is the most promising as it provides benefits to both licensed and unlicensed users. In this model, CR-enabled service providers, also known as secondary service providers, can buy or lease spectrum from licensed, known as primary service providers, for both short and long duration and gain exclusive rights to access the spectrum. In this survey paper, exclusive-use trading approaches, namely, game theory, market equilibrium, and classical, hybrid and other models are reviewed extensively and their characteristics and differences are highlighted and compared. We also propose possible future research directions on exclusive-use CR model.
AB - Spectrum frequency is a valuable resource for wireless communication but very limited in its availability. Due to the extensive use and ever increasing demand of spectrum bands by wireless devices and newer applications, unlicensed band is becoming congested, while licensed bands are found mostly under-utilized. To solve this problem of spectrum scarcity, Cognitive Radio (CR) devices can share licensed bands opportunistically in several ways. We analyze the three main dynamic sharing models (commons, shared-use and exclusive-use) proposed in literature with extensive analysis of the exclusive-use model, which is the most promising as it provides benefits to both licensed and unlicensed users. In this model, CR-enabled service providers, also known as secondary service providers, can buy or lease spectrum from licensed, known as primary service providers, for both short and long duration and gain exclusive rights to access the spectrum. In this survey paper, exclusive-use trading approaches, namely, game theory, market equilibrium, and classical, hybrid and other models are reviewed extensively and their characteristics and differences are highlighted and compared. We also propose possible future research directions on exclusive-use CR model.
KW - auction
KW - cognitive radio network
KW - game theory
KW - market equilibrium.
KW - Spectrum trading
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85023624101&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/COMST.2017.2725960
DO - 10.1109/COMST.2017.2725960
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85023624101
SN - 1553-877X
VL - 19
SP - 2192
EP - 2231
JO - IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
JF - IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
IS - 4
ER -