Everettian quantum mechanics without branching time

Alastair Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper I assess the prospects for combining contemporary Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) with branching-time semantics in the tradition of Kripke, Prior, Thomason and Belnap. I begin by outlining the salient features of 'decoherence-based' EQM, and of the 'consistent histories' formalism that is particularly apt for conceptual discussions in EQM. This formalism permits of both 'branching worlds' and 'parallel worlds' interpretations; the metaphysics of EQM is in this sense underdetermined by the physics. A prominent argument due to Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) supports the non-branching interpretation. Belnap et al. (Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterministic World, 2001) refer to Lewis' argument as the 'Assertion problem', and propose a pragmatic response to it. I argue that their response is unattractively ad hoc and complex, and that it prevents an Everettian who adopts branching-time semantics from making clear sense of objective probability. The upshot is that Everettians are better off without branching-time semantics. I conclude by discussing and rejecting an alternative possible motivation for branching time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)67-84
Number of pages18
JournalSynthese
Volume188
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2012

Keywords

  • Belnap
  • Branching
  • Divergence
  • Everett
  • Lewis
  • Many worlds
  • Metaphysics
  • Quantum
  • Semantics
  • Time

Cite this