Equity pledge, pledgor type and investment efficiency

Karren Lee-Hwei Khaw, Jiaying Chen, Muhammad Awais Gulzar, Ahmad Hakimi Tajuddin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

Equity pledging is susceptible to agency problems and substantial risk, resulting in inefficient corporate investment. We show that the negative impact is not just induced by controlling shareholders but also pledged by non-controlling shareholders. Our results add that SOEs with control rights via controlling shareholders or actual controllers can mitigate investment inefficiency problems. We conclude that pledgor-type matters and the impact of non-controlling shareholders' pledges should not be neglected.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)22-32
Number of pages11
JournalApplied Finance Letters
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 16 May 2023

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