TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks
AU - Xu, Jin
AU - Zenou, Yves
AU - Zhou, Junjie
N1 - Funding Information:
This paper has been previously circulated under the title “Networks in Conflict: A Variational Inequality Approach.” We thank the editor Marzena Rostek, three anonymous referees as well as Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch, Luis Corchon, Christian Ewerhart, Jörg Franke, Qiang Fu, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Dan Kovenock, Jingfeng Lu, Mihai Manea, Emerson Melo, John Morgan, Asu Ozdaglar, Francesca Parise, Philip J. Reny, Evan Sadler, Ron Siegel, Joel Sobel, Xiang Sun, Satoru Takahashi, Takashi Ui, Ruqu Wang, Zenan Wu, Jun Zhang, and seminar participants at a number of universities and conferences, for their comments and useful suggestions. Xu thanks The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72073083 , 72192842 , 72071121 ), and Shandong University multidisciplinary research and innovation team of young scholars (No. 2020QNQT017 ) for financial support. Zhou acknowledges support from Tsinghua Strategy for Heightening Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences : “Plateaus & Peaks” (No. 2022TSG08102 ).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2022/12
Y1 - 2022/12
N2 - We establish the general properties of equilibria (existence and uniqueness) in a very general model of interconnected multiplayer conflicts. In particular, under mild conditions on the cost function and the contest technology, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the set of Nash equilibria is convex. Furthermore, under the strong monotonicity of the cost function, the equilibrium is unique, regardless of the conflict structure. To establish these properties of equilibria, we use variational inequality techniques to obtain equivalent equilibrium characterizations. After conducting comparative statics analysis with respect to the model primitives, we explore, in several simple examples of conflict structures, how shocks that originated locally propagate to the rest of the conflict network. Our general framework subsumes a number of models studied in the contest literature, as we are able to generalize many results obtained in these papers.
AB - We establish the general properties of equilibria (existence and uniqueness) in a very general model of interconnected multiplayer conflicts. In particular, under mild conditions on the cost function and the contest technology, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the set of Nash equilibria is convex. Furthermore, under the strong monotonicity of the cost function, the equilibrium is unique, regardless of the conflict structure. To establish these properties of equilibria, we use variational inequality techniques to obtain equivalent equilibrium characterizations. After conducting comparative statics analysis with respect to the model primitives, we explore, in several simple examples of conflict structures, how shocks that originated locally propagate to the rest of the conflict network. Our general framework subsumes a number of models studied in the contest literature, as we are able to generalize many results obtained in these papers.
KW - Comparative statics
KW - Equilibrium existence
KW - Multi-battle contest
KW - Network game
KW - Uniqueness
KW - Variational inequality
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85141292663
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105571
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105571
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85141292663
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 206
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
M1 - 105571
ER -