Equilibria of concurrent games on event structures

Julian Gutierrez, Michael Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference PaperResearchpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


Event structures form a canonical model of concurrent behaviour which has a natural game-theoretic interpretation. This game-based interpretation was initially given for zero-sum concurrent games. This paper studies an extension of such games on event structures to include a much wider class of game types and solution concepts. The extension permits modelling scenarios where, for instance, cooperation or independent goal-driven behaviour of computer agents is desired. Specifically, we will define non-zero-sum games on event structures, and give full characterisations-existence and completeness results-of the kinds of games, payoff sets, and strategies for which Nash equilibria and subgame perfect Nash equilibria always exist. The game semantics of various logics and systems are outlined to illustrate the power of this framework.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Joint Meeting of the Twenty-Third EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic CSL) and the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS)
EditorsThomas Henzinger, Dale Miller
Place of PublicationNew York NY USA
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery (ACM)
Number of pages10
ISBN (Print)9781450328869
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
EventIEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science 2014 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: 14 Jul 201418 Jul 2014
Conference number: 29th


ConferenceIEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science 2014
Abbreviated titleLICS 2014
Internet address


  • Concurrent games
  • Event structures
  • Nash equilibria

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