TY - JOUR
T1 - Endogenous games and mechanisms
T2 - side payments among players
AU - Jackson, Matthew O.
AU - Wilkie, Simon
PY - 2005/4
Y1 - 2005/4
N2 - We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
AB - We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=16344384246&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:16344384246
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 72
SP - 543
EP - 566
JO - The Review of Economic Studies
JF - The Review of Economic Studies
IS - 2
ER -