Abstract
The Egyptian nuclear weapons program-started in 1960 and closed by 1973-can lend insights into today’ s potential proliferators. First, a number of signs indicating that Cairo was pursing a nuclear option were present, giving us insight into what type of signs we might see from countries seeking nuclear weapons today. While indicators do not necessarily connote intent, my research shows that in the Egyptian case, these signs were indeed warnings that Cairo was seeking a military nuclear capability. Second, a number of external and internal factors combined to shut down the nuclear program, and fortunately, some of these external factors are still applicable today, giving us potential tools to use in persuading other states to forgo nuclear weapons.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 555-567 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Nonproliferation Review |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2006 |
Keywords
- Counterproliferation
- Egypt
- Middle East nuclear conflict
- Naser
- NPT
- Nuclear forbearance
- Nuclear power
- Nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear weapons
- Sadat