Effect of matching mechanism on learning in games played under limited information

Nicholas Feltovich, Hidenori Sobei Oda

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the effect of the matching mechanism on learning in 2 x 2 games. Six games are played repeatedly under either fixed pairs or random matching. Unlike most economics experiments, the games are played under limited information: subjects are never shown the games payoff matrices nor given information about opponent payoffs. We find that behaviour, while initially similar between treatments, diverges over time. In most but not all games, fixed-pairs matching is associated with increased coordination on pure-strategy Nash equilibria, higher-payoff equilibria being reached and faster convergence toward pure-strategy play.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)260 - 277
Number of pages18
JournalPacific Economic Review
Volume19
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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